The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis

DOI10.1007/s10887-011-9068-zzbMath1222.91047OpenAlexW2112326359MaRDI QIDQ720399

Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Klaus Desmet, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 14 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/14227

zbMATH Keywords

unificationEuropecultural heterogeneitygenetic diversitynation formationsecessionYugoslavia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Uses Software

• sedaR

Cites Work

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