A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction

DOI10.1007/s10992-017-9433-2zbMath1436.91005OpenAlexW2592078838MaRDI QIDQ722022

Riccardo Bruni, Giacomo Sillari

Publication date: 20 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9433-2

zbMATH Keywords

circular conceptsthe revision theory of truthepistemic foundation (of game theory)social situationsstrategic rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (1)

Guest editors' introduction

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Social software
• Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
• SOLOVAY-TYPE THEOREMS FOR CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Admissibility in Games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction