Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:722093
DOI10.1007/s10472-017-9565-7zbMath1404.91082OpenAlexW2766698873MaRDI QIDQ722093
Publication date: 20 July 2018
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-017-9565-7
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
- How hard is it to control an election?
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- More Natural Models of Electoral Control by Partition
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
- Dichotomy for Pure Scoring Rules Under Manipulative Electoral Actions
- Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
- Weighted Electoral Control
