Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1049-9zbMath1403.91211OpenAlexW2609537768MaRDI QIDQ722621

Kazuhiko Hashimoto

Publication date: 27 July 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1049-9

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessidentical preferences lower boundPareto-efficiencytop trading cycle rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

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