When should a retailer invest in brand advertising?
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Publication:723962
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.060zbMath1403.90456OpenAlexW2773529603MaRDI QIDQ723962
Baris Vardar, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 25 July 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.060
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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Cites Work
- Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product
- Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract
- Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?
- Recent developments in dynamic advertising research
- Vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain: a game-theoretic approach
- A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
- When does a royalty clause with a guarantee lead to a no-equilibrium situation in a licensing contract?
- Advertising and Price to Sustain The Brand Value in a Licensing Contract
- Dynamic Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent Developments
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