When should a retailer invest in brand advertising?

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.060zbMath1403.90456OpenAlexW2773529603MaRDI QIDQ723962

Baris Vardar, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 25 July 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.060

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesmarketing channelsadvertisingOR in marketingbrand reputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (6)

Accounting for consumers' environmental concern in supply chain contracts ⋮ Channel coordination under Nash bargaining fairness concerns in differential games of goodwill accumulation ⋮ A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics ⋮ Should a manufacturer give up pricing power in a vertical information-sharing channel? ⋮ Decisions on production and quality ⋮ Private label sourcing for an e-tailer with agency selling and service provision

Cites Work

• Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product
• Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract
• Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?
• Recent developments in dynamic advertising research
• Vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain: a game-theoretic approach
• A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
• When does a royalty clause with a guarantee lead to a no-equilibrium situation in a licensing contract?
• Advertising and Price to Sustain The Brand Value in a Licensing Contract
• Dynamic Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent Developments

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