When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
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Publication:725041
DOI10.3390/g7040028zbMath1406.91065OpenAlexW2530964116MaRDI QIDQ725041
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040028
Related Items (3)
Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction ⋮ A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability ⋮ Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
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