Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation

DOI10.3390/G7040033zbMath1406.91010OpenAlexW2543633881MaRDI QIDQ725055

Marian Panganiban, Wladislaw Mill, Mike Farjam

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040033

zbMATH Keywords

games on graphsindirect reciprocitystrategic ignorancegood willunconditional cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)

Uses Software

• NetLogo

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Direct reciprocity on graphs
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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