Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies

DOI10.3390/g8010003zbMath1407.91061OpenAlexW2563513479MaRDI QIDQ725074

Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010003

zbMATH Keywords

strategyevolutionary game theorybackward inductionepistemic game theoryBayesian epistemologybelief-revision policynaturalistic game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction

Cites Work

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