Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6zbMath1349.91179OpenAlexW2183252613MaRDI QIDQ726619

Michel Poitevin, Stefan Ambec

Publication date: 12 July 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6

zbMATH Keywords

organizationsdecentralizationincentivesmechanism designnon-commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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