Fifteen arguments against hypothetical frequentism

DOI10.1007/s10670-009-9154-1zbMath1178.03009OpenAlexW2113655903MaRDI QIDQ732263

Alan Hájek

Publication date: 9 October 2009

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9154-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items (9)

No interpretation of probability ⋮ Mechanistic probability ⋮ Propensities and transcendental assumptions ⋮ Probability and manipulation: evolution and simulation in applied population genetics ⋮ Natural probabilistic information ⋮ Probabilities as ratios of ranges in initial-state spaces ⋮ The first random walk: a note on John Venn's graph ⋮ John Venn's Hypothetical Infinite Frequentism and Logic ⋮ On the very idea of distant correlations

Cites Work

• Counterfactuals and comparative possibility
• What conditional probability could not be
• The shooting-room paradox and conditionalizing on measurably challenged sets
• On the degrees of unsolvability of modal predicate logics of provability
• On the concept of a random sequence
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