A core of voting games with improved foresight

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003zbMath1193.91046OpenAlexW2064909507MaRDI QIDQ732925

Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 15 October 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

stability setcoreno-regret propertyvoting gamesforesighted coreP-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Matrix representation of stability definitions for the graph model for conflict resolution with reciprocal preference relations

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
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• Stability of voting games
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
• ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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