Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.05.002zbMath1177.91068OpenAlexW3125944074WikidataQ61638348 ScholiaQ61638348MaRDI QIDQ732928

Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler, Ulrich Pferschy

Publication date: 15 October 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssocial choiceminimal spanning tree

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Finding socially best spanning treesî ⋮ Committee selection under weight constraints ⋮ How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee? ⋮ POPULAR SPANNING TREES ⋮ A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees

Cites Work

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• Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
• Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Robust discrete optimization and its applications
• Approximating Min-Max (Regret) Versions of Some Polynomial Problems
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• The complexity of satisfiability problems

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