Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.03.003zbMath1195.91112OpenAlexW1978258801MaRDI QIDQ733498

Jorge Soares, Marina Azzimonti, Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte

Publication date: 16 October 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

Ramseycommitmenttime consistencydiscretionpublic investmentMarkov-perfect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model ⋮ Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions ⋮ Present-biased government and sovereign debt dynamics

Cites Work

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• FISCAL POLICY IN A GROWING ECONOMY WITH PUBLIC CAPITAL
• Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
• Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model

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