Network design with weighted players

DOI10.1007/s00224-008-9128-8zbMath1176.91003OpenAlexW1991307017MaRDI QIDQ733733

Tim Roughgarden, Ho-Lin Chen

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-008-9128-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumnetwork designalgorithmic game theoryprice of stabilitycost sharesShapley cost shares

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

Related Items (42)

Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games ⋮ Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games ⋮ Tight Bounds for Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Cost-Sharing Scheduling Games on Restricted Unrelated Machines ⋮ On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games ⋮ Cost-sharing scheduling games on restricted unrelated machines ⋮ The Price of Matching with Metric Preferences ⋮ Network-formation games with regular objectives ⋮ Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games ⋮ Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses ⋮ Sensitivity Analysis for Convex Separable Optimization Over Integral Polymatroids ⋮ \(\mathcal{NP}\)-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium in scheduling and network design games ⋮ Timing matters: online dynamics in broadcast games ⋮ Cost-sharing games with rank-based utilities ⋮ On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games ⋮ Strategic multiway cut and multicut games ⋮ The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant ⋮ Characterizing the existence of potential functions in weighted congestion games ⋮ Price of stability in survivable network design ⋮ The ring design game with fair cost allocation ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games ⋮ Hierarchical Network Formation Games ⋮ Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Non-cooperative facility location and covering games ⋮ Competitive cost sharing with economies of scale ⋮ Exact and approximate equilibria for optimal group network formation ⋮ An \(O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games ⋮ Dynamic resource allocation games ⋮ Congestion Games with Variable Demands ⋮ On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems ⋮ Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty ⋮ Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems ⋮ Non-cooperative queueing games on a network of single server queues ⋮ A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares ⋮ Dynamic Resource Allocation Games ⋮ Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games ⋮ The Price of Stability of Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Geometric spanner games ⋮ Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies ⋮ A unifying approximate potential for weighted congestion games ⋮ Equilibria in Multiclass and Multidimensional Atomic Congestion Games

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