Marriage matching and gender satisfaction

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0303-2zbMath1183.91113OpenAlexW2028350568MaRDI QIDQ733764

Vicki Knoblauch

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0303-2

zbMATH Keywords

matchingGale-Shapleywomen's rankings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice ⋮ The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A further note on the stable matching problem
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Kidney Exchange
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem

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