On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
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Publication:733769
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9zbMath1184.91090OpenAlexW2074305913MaRDI QIDQ733769
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9
Related Items (3)
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Cites Work
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Choice under complete uncertainty: Axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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