Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0312-1zbMath1184.91134OpenAlexW2168860948MaRDI QIDQ733774

Özgür Kıbrıs, Serkan Kucuksenel

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityanonymityindependence of trade volumerenegotiation proofnessvoluntary trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints ⋮ On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ Allocation rules on networks

Cites Work

• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
• Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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