Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0327-7zbMath1184.91079OpenAlexW2042963133WikidataQ50417120 ScholiaQ50417120MaRDI QIDQ733784

Lowell Bruce Anderson, James E. Falk, Helena Dandurova, Lana E. Yeganova

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5830124

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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