The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0329-5zbMath1184.91094OpenAlexW1989274590MaRDI QIDQ733785

Ryusuke Shinohara

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10091/3163

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumstrict Nash equilibriumparticipation gamemulti-unit public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (5)

Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good ⋮ Participation and demand levels for a joint project ⋮ Reciprocity networks and the participation problem ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Public goods provision: unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

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