Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0331-yzbMath1187.91059OpenAlexW1972689981MaRDI QIDQ733788

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0331-y

zbMATH Keywords

social choicesocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy ⋮ Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules ⋮ Strategy-proofness and weighted voting ⋮ No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles ⋮ Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers ⋮ Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

Cites Work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Optimal Auction Design

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