Framing the rabbit to snare the votes

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0341-9zbMath1180.91102OpenAlexW2046103785MaRDI QIDQ733806

Ehud Menirav, Tomer Blumkin

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0341-9

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcognitive psychologypayroll taxpoliical competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Cognitive psychology (91E10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence

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