Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6zbMath1183.91043OpenAlexW1976944491MaRDI QIDQ734044

Sayantan Ghosal, Ben Lockwood

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6

zbMATH Keywords

voluntary votingcompulsory votingheterogeneous informationPareto-rankingprivate preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (11)

Participation in fraudulent elections ⋮ A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs ⋮ The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ Civic duty and political advertising ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence ⋮ The political (in)stability of funded social security ⋮ On the consensus effect

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Information acquisition in committees
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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