The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?

DOI10.1007/S00712-009-0080-0zbMath1183.91084OpenAlexW2029600862MaRDI QIDQ735171

Mehmet Bac, Serife Genc

Publication date: 21 October 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0080-0

zbMATH Keywords

contractsefficient screeningFrench labor law reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats

Cites Work

• The Effect of Job Heterogeneity on Reservation Wages
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

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