Bounds for best response functions in binary games
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Publication:738103
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.008zbMath1441.62776OpenAlexW1981990623MaRDI QIDQ738103
Publication date: 15 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.008
multiple equilibriaNash equilibriummixed strategiestreatment effectsentry gamespeer effectsbest response functionsbinary gameslevels of rationality
Related Items (4)
Nonparametric identification of the distribution of random coefficients in binary response static games of complete information ⋮ Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under partial identification ⋮ Identification of complete information games ⋮ Bidding frictions in ascending auctions
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