Bounds for best response functions in binary games

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.008zbMath1441.62776OpenAlexW1981990623MaRDI QIDQ738103

Elie Tamer, Brendan Kline

Publication date: 15 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaNash equilibriummixed strategiestreatment effectsentry gamespeer effectsbest response functionsbinary gameslevels of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (4)

Nonparametric identification of the distribution of random coefficients in binary response static games of complete information ⋮ Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under partial identification ⋮ Identification of complete information games ⋮ Bidding frictions in ascending auctions

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