Economic juries and public project provision

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.010zbMath1441.62812OpenAlexW2013382756MaRDI QIDQ738105

Daniel McFadden

Publication date: 15 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.010

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemset identificationjurieswelfare theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Cites Work

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