The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.03.017zbMath1343.91040OpenAlexW2303181873WikidataQ47790428 ScholiaQ47790428MaRDI QIDQ738551

Jennifer M. Larson

Publication date: 5 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.03.017

zbMATH Keywords

networksevolutioncooperationsanctioningcognitive limitations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The evolution of norms
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Direct reciprocity in structured populations
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation with Network Monitoring
• Trust and Social Collateral^*

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