Optimal task assignments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.05.002zbMath1394.91259OpenAlexW566279577MaRDI QIDQ738920

Felipe Balmaceda

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.845.4278

zbMATH Keywords

supermodularitysubmodularitymoral hazardspecializationmultitasking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Matching with peer monitoring ⋮ Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary? ⋮ Multitask assignments with adverse selection

Cites Work

• Combinatorial agency
• All-or-nothing payments
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

This page was built for publication: Optimal task assignments