On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.003zbMath1394.91037OpenAlexW2411280372MaRDI QIDQ738921

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5067/1/2016_GEB.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitycooperationprisoner's dilemmaindirect reciprocityfirst-order informationimage scoringdonation gamefirst-order assessment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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