Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.007zbMath1394.91251OpenAlexW3122263007MaRDI QIDQ738936

Giorgio Martini

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessrandom serial dictatorshiprandom assignmentordinal efficiencynon-wastefulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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