Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
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Publication:738942
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013zbMath1394.91182OpenAlexW2472957510MaRDI QIDQ738942
Publication date: 16 August 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013
Decision theory (91B06) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations ⋮ Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
Cites Work
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- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
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- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
- Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
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