Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009zbMath1394.91157OpenAlexW2466340371MaRDI QIDQ738943

Thomas R. Palfrey, Salvatore Nunnari, Colin F. Camerer

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

experimentestimationauctionsQREcommon-value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: an experimental investigation ⋮ The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation ⋮ Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions ⋮ TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS ⋮ Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
• No trade
• Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions
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• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
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• Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
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• A Comment on “Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study”
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Quantal Response Equilibrium
• A new look at the statistical model identification

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