Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.041zbMath1343.92363OpenAlexW3122552511WikidataQ50649412 ScholiaQ50649412MaRDI QIDQ739686

Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand, Oliver P. Hauser

Publication date: 19 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10871/33553

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary dynamicsmutation ratesanti-social punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (10)

Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata ⋮ Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration ⋮ Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment ⋮ The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors ⋮ The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network ⋮ Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies ⋮ Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation

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