Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009zbMath1295.91044OpenAlexW1975530003MaRDI QIDQ741310

Conal Duddy

Publication date: 11 September 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityapproval votingcommittee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

Cites Work

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• Approval voting: three examples
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
• Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
• The Basic Approval Voting Game

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