A continuum of commitment

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.04.013zbMath1295.91018OpenAlexW2077567401MaRDI QIDQ741317

Thomas A. Weber

Publication date: 11 September 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantagetime consistencyendogenous commitmentadjustment costprincipal agent modelregulatory commitmentsecond-mover advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

A robust resolution of Newcomb's paradox ⋮ Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

Cites Work

• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Commitment vs. Flexibility
• Mathematical analysis II. Transl. from the 4th Russian edition by Roger Cooke
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