A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot

DOI10.1007/s00712-012-0280-xzbMath1294.91084OpenAlexW2148630331MaRDI QIDQ741578

Kai Andree

Publication date: 12 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x

zbMATH Keywords

price competitionmergermixed duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
• Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs
• Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly
• Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct firms

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