The bargaining set for sharing the power

DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1411-7zbMath1303.91028OpenAlexW1972548480MaRDI QIDQ744668

Vito Fragnelli, Michela Chessa

Publication date: 26 September 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1411-7

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesbargaining setpower indicesblackmailing behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• OPEN PROBLEMS IN VETO THEORY