Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.010zbMath1368.91041OpenAlexW768483753MaRDI QIDQ745004

Xi Weng

Publication date: 12 October 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.010

zbMATH Keywords

delaylearningincomplete informationwar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• The war of attrition with incomplete information
• Continuous-time games of timing
• Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• Strategic Experimentation
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Quitting Games

This page was built for publication: Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?