Bargaining through approval
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Publication:745006
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015zbMath1368.91080OpenAlexW2243533746MaRDI QIDQ745006
Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez
Publication date: 12 October 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-06.pdf
Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
Threshold voting leads to type-revelation ⋮ Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem
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