Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.001zbMath1368.91042OpenAlexW1486064085MaRDI QIDQ745019

Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal

Publication date: 12 October 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2014-04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

inverse problemkerneldirect-sum decompositionaverage tree solutioninvariance to irrelevant coalitionsweighted addition invariance on bi-partitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (6)

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution ⋮ Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value ⋮ Discounted tree solutions ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games

Cites Work

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