Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
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Publication:745064
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034zbMath1322.91019OpenAlexW2046533010WikidataQ42680358 ScholiaQ42680358MaRDI QIDQ745064
Fabio Dercole, Fabio Della Rossa, Marco De Carli, Alessandro Vittorio Papadopoulos
Publication date: 13 October 2015
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Elements of applied bifurcation theory
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