Dynamic models of conflicts. III: Hierarchical games
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Publication:747330
DOI10.1134/S000511791502006XzbMath1406.91074MaRDI QIDQ747330
M. A. Gorelov, A. F. Kononenko
Publication date: 23 October 2015
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Games with forbidden situations. Models with soft constraints
- Maximal guaranteed result for limited volume of transmitted information
- Dynamic models of conflicts. II. Equilibria
- Dynamical conflict models. I. Language of modeling
- Games with forbidden situations. Models with hard constraints
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