An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:747347
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0879-6zbMath1367.91037OpenAlexW333800723MaRDI QIDQ747347
Jean-François Caulier, Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Publication date: 23 October 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01207823/file/allocation-rule-dynamic3.pdf
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stochastic bankruptcy games
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
- Transferable utility games with uncertainty
- A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
- (Non-)existence and scope of Nash networks
- Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
- Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- On weighted Shapley values
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
- A value with incomplete communication
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Communication situations with asymmetric players.
- An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations
- Values for Markovian coalition processes
- Networks and farsighted stability
- The core of a repeated \(n\)-person cooperative game
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Forming efficient networks
- A probabilistic position value
- Weighted position values
- Link formation in cooperative situations.
- Dynamic network formation with incomplete information
- The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- Farsighted network formation
- Allocation rules for network games
- A note on a value with incomplete communication
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- A characterization of the position value
- A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- A dynamic model of network formation
- Non-myopic formation of circle networks
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
This page was built for publication: An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
