Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0867-xzbMath1367.91024OpenAlexW1574316389MaRDI QIDQ747348

Licun Xue, Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 23 October 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171308

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative game theoryexternalitieslinked issues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ On convexity in cooperative games with externalities ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

Cites Work

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• AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM

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