On the tournament equilibrium set

DOI10.1007/BF01376285zbMath0713.90007OpenAlexW2015546293MaRDI QIDQ750267

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01376285

zbMATH Keywords

minimal covering setSchwartz's tournament equilibrium set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Weak covering relations ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz ⋮ A note on contestation-based tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ Still more on the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

Cites Work

• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions

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