Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
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Publication:751456
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-DzbMath0714.90008MaRDI QIDQ751456
Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Utility theory (91B16) Dynamic programming (90C39) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
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