Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments

DOI10.1007/BF01761075zbMath0714.90105OpenAlexW2106622020MaRDI QIDQ751520

Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761075

zbMATH Keywords

games without side paymentsstability propertiespre-kernelassignment gamesstable solutioncore-kernel intersectionnontransferrable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ Reinterpreting the kernel ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities

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