Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
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Publication:751947
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90227-RzbMath0715.90011OpenAlexW1978810433MaRDI QIDQ751947
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90227-r
Related Items (5)
Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
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