Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90227-RzbMath0715.90011OpenAlexW1978810433MaRDI QIDQ751947

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90227-r

zbMATH Keywords

private informationpublic informationdominant strategiescollective choicetruthful revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Incentives in Teams
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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