Impossibility results with resoluteness

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90174-YzbMath0715.90012OpenAlexW1997140905MaRDI QIDQ751949

Jerry S. Kelly, Maxwell Hall

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90174-y

zbMATH Keywords

Paretoneutrality anonymityresolute social choice ruleuniversal domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Learning context-dependent choice functions

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Unnamed Item

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