A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-WzbMath0715.90032OpenAlexW2035357293MaRDI QIDQ751973

Shinsuke Nakamura

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-w

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumtwo- agent economyweakly balanced and continuous mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments ⋮ Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies

Cites Work

• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Unnamed Item

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