Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90008-5zbMath0716.90010OpenAlexW1518681786MaRDI QIDQ753631

Mark Salmon, Tamer Başar

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/340

zbMATH Keywords

monetary authorityoptimal Stackelberg policysuboptimal certainty- equivalent Nash policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

CAUTION OR ACTIVISM? MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY ⋮ Learning rational expectations in a policy game

Cites Work

• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• Solutions to a class of nonstandard stochastic control problems with active learning

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